Introduction
Leigh Jenco, LSE Why should political theorists, such as readers of this journal, engage Confucianism?
Despite its ancient vintage, this philosophy (or perhaps more precisely, "body of thought") has not long been on the radar screens of Anglophone political theorists, except perhaps in relation to some unsavory positions in international politics. The association of "Confucianism" with historically non-democratic states has given rise to numerous apologetics defending its logic in the name of an authoritarian elite (Bell, 2006 (Bell, , 2015 Zakaria, 1994) -something the governments of Singapore and the People's Republic of China have used to their advantage. These associations have unfortunately colored the term with a tinge of cultural essentialism or reactionary nativism, further reinforced by the claims of academic philosophers such as Tongdong Bai that study of a narrow (and historically indefensible) set of core Confucian texts can explain "the Chinese mind" (Bai, 2012: 5) .
Attempting to rescue the insights of Confucian learning from its politicized appropriations has become a veritable cottage industry within comparative philosophy circles.
Unfortunately, these debates also focus on the classical sources-and a growing, albeit largely self-referential, English-language scholarship-while excluding a large part of the historically relevant Confucian canon.
i In the process, they threaten to reify the thought of ancient China as the origin of distinctive "schools" or "isms" that somehow endure as coherent traditions outside of particular social or political contexts (Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan, 2003) .
These (mis)appropriations add to the morass of interpretations that attend translation of ruxue-a heterogenous bundle of scholarly traditions and commitments, stretching out over more than two millennia across eastern Asia, with varying and sometimes downright minimal or nonexistent links to the historical figure of Confucius himself-into the English reification "Confucianism" (for an overview of this complex history see Jensen, 1997) . Its longstanding yet sometimes ambivalent association with governance-whether in terms of its ideological deployment by dynastic houses, its promulgation by local elites, or the background assumptions it offered to active members of the public-only further complicates the picture of what it amounts to, and how it might (or even should) be corralled into use as a "philosophy" or "political theory" (see, e.g., Chen, 2003; Peng, 2003) . As Benjamin Elman notes in his magisterial study of evidential learning (kaozheng), the Qing-era historicist turn of ruxue that is almost systematically ignored by contemporary political theorist and philosophers: "it is hard to think of any idea responsible for more fuzziness in writing about
China than the notion that Confucianism is one thing" (Elman, 2001: xxi exclude Confucian ideas from our study of political thinking would be to do ourselves-not to mention our very subject of research-a great disservice. Carrying forward Confucian teaching or forms of knowledge-production within the discipline is perhaps, at this stage, a prohibitively ambitious goal. But we may nevertheless examine how its associated texts, arguments, traditions or practices might challenge how we do business. Although its sheer heterogeneity prevents a full accounting of how it might productively challenge existing academic dogma, we might consider a salient example drawn from another discipline.
Working in the fields of anthropology and religious studies, Michael Puett has argued that there exists a distinctive indigenous ritual theory in early Chinese Confucian texts overlooked by philosophers, such as the Book of Rites, which provides both an alternative and rejoinder to contemporary theories of religion which claim their humanism as a distinctively modern feature. Because these early Chinese ritual theories "were based upon working out the implications of the ways that rituals were explicitly operating," they did not work on the register of belief (as do contemporary ritual theories, beholden to Protestant political theology; see Asad, 1993) . Rather, they worked on the register of what Puett calls the "as if." Ritualistic constructions of "as if" worlds enable us to "alter the relationship between the participants" in such ritual (Puett, 2013: 99) As Puett explains, in this particular ritual,
The son plays the role of the grandfather, and the father-the living ruler-plays the role of the son to his father-who is actually his own son. And it is precisely through this reversed role-playing that the relation between father and son-the living son to his living father, and the living father to his deceased father-is made clear (Puett, 2013: 98).
Through such reverse-role-play, participants in this ritual could see with greater clarity "the disjunction between the world of ritual and the world of the everyday" (Puett, 2013: 99; see also Seligman et al., 2008) . This self-evident disjunction does not pose a rupture, but rather creates a new space from which to consider the relationship between participants. In doing so, this ritual theory emphasizes the understudied role of ritual in our daily life, while providing an alternative to ritual theories which turn on belief, conscience, and Christian forms of divinity.
This set of essays in this volume is inspired by such potential for theoretical enrichment when the resources of such historically influential (but overlooked) texts are drawn into analysis, and when their contexts in larger worlds of practice are taken into account.
Accordingly, we take on Confucius and Confucianism in a new way. Our hope is to avoid much of the cultural and intellectual essentialism that bedevils attempts to present Confucian learning as compelling and relevant. Because essentialism derives in large part from a lack of attention to contextual particularity, it is perhaps not surprising that these essays combat it by focusing on the productive relationship between what we might call Confucian learning and its contexts. These contexts are not only historical but also institutional, personal, and political: they situate Confucius among his contemporaries, within his own past, and amid the range of debates his ideas spawned in later centuries.
Attention to these contexts, we hope collectively to argue, does not necessarily confine Confucius into either side of this binary, Kim notes how Confucius' claims about the past seem to involve a form of meta-knowing: a recognition of the subject of knowing as tractable to virtuous cultivation, and thus as capable of forming critical distance between her-or himself and the object which s/he knows. In short, the subject of knowing for Confucius must be conscious of the epistemological limits of her or his own belief. As Kim puts it, "Confucius constructs the subject not as one who is passively shaped by the power of supernatural beings but as an active agent whose subjectivity is continuously shaped through his or her engagements within multiple and complex spaces that the meta-consciousness creates" (Kim, this issue, XX). Given this, Kim argues, we might understand Confucius' frequent references to the Zhou dynasty to be operating as an imagined signifier rather than a set of historical claims, but where each of these requires the other to make their content imaginable. The Zhou, on this view, becomes "tenseless" for Confucius; "The untensed character of this conceptual Zhou," Kim explains, allows Confucius (or ourselves) "to identify with, resurrect, and relive the life of the past in its totality" (Kim, this issue, XX). what is yet to come.
His lucid and innovative analysis takes
It is perhaps fitting to conclude this set of essays by returning to this warning. In more than one sense, our own historical context (however one may construe the "our") is both unusual and unprecedented. Scholarship in global and comparative history reminds us that European dominance is not an inevitable telos, but rather an aberration (and a relatively short one at that) within the longue durée of a world history dominated by Asia (Clulow, 2013; Pomeranz, 2000; Wong, 1997) . Part of interrogating the stability and certainty of our own present condition-including the ethnocentric intellectual confines of our own scholarly disciplines-includes enabling these global trends of the past to have influence in our present. This is yet another reason, perhaps the most important reason, that political theorists should engage Confucianism. For all we know, it may well be the future. And it should certainly inform our present, enabling us to learn more about ourselves as well as others.
